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MORGAN'S RAID IN INDIANA.

BY MARGRETTE BOYER.

[The following painstaking study of Morgan's Raid in Indiana was prepared as a thesis by Miss Boyer, a student in Butler College. It is the fullest account we have seen, and as such we are glad to give it publicity, believing it to be a valuable addition to the literature that exists on this romantic episode of our State's history.—EDITOR.]

A STUDY of Morgan's raid in Indiana reveals that it was important in the history of the State and of the nation. It is not from a military standpoint, however, that we can estimate the historical value of this dashing exploit. It had practically no influence upon the outcome of the Civil War, and it failed in all that it meant to accomplish. Contrary to its designed purpose of working injury to the Union cause, the raid ultimately proved a blessing. The State of Indiana seemed for a time to be wavering in its loyalty. The raid offered an opportunity for the Indiana people to show their devotion to the national government, and they did so nobly. Indiana proved herself staunchly bound to the Union. This Morgan's raid did accomplish, and for this reason it deserves a place in history.

General Morgan's theory of waging war was to go deep into the heart of the enemy's country. He had sought long and earnestly for permission to put this theory into practice. A raid into Ohio had long been his fondest dream and now, about the middle of June, 1863, upon his arrival in Alexandria, Kentucky, the golden opportunity seemed to lie before him. The situation in Tennessee was daily growing more pressing for the Confederate armies there. It was soon evident that some solution for their problem must be found. General Bragg's army lay at Tullahoma in Central Tennessee with his cavalry covering his front. Gen-

eral Buckner was in East Tennessee with an inadequate force. General Bragg was confronted by General Rosecrans's superior force, and Major-General Burnside was planning an invasion of East Tennessee with his cavalry under Colonel Sanders. Bragg dared not strengthen Buckner nor could Buckner send aid to Bragg. Unless some movement were set on foot to call away Federal attention, the Confederates in Tennessee would be trapped. The situation generally, for the Confederates, demanded some diversion, and here was Morgan's chance. A raid through Indiana and Ohio, he thought, would call the attention of the Federal troops away from Bragg's retreat, would require that they lessen their forces to pursue the raiders, would prevent the junction of the Federal forces in Tennessee, and would check Burnside's invasion of East Tennessee. Morgan was confident that such a raid would keep the Union forces busy for weeks.

General Bragg was shrewd enough to see the value of a raid at this time, but was more conservative than Morgan. He thought a raid in Kentucky alone, having as its object the capture of Louisville, would serve the purpose of a diversion without the unnecessary wide separation of his forces. Morgan said that one of his main objects was to draw troops away from Rosecrans and that a raid in Kentucky would be too close at hand and too soon ended to accomplish this. Morgan wished to sweep all before him, cut off all railway communications around Louisville so that no reinforcements could be sent there, dash through Indiana and Ohio and bring the raid to a close at Cincinnati. Buckner would capture Louisville and join Morgan in Ohio. Buckner's part in this plan was prevented by the unexpected advance of Rosecrans. In spite of Morgan's objections, General Bragg's orders stated that Morgan should make the raid, but expressly forbade his crossing the Ohio. With characteristic recklessness, Morgan determined to disregard his orders and make the raid according to his own plans. The raid in Indiana and Ohio in July, 1863, was, then, in disobedience of strict orders. Had the raid been a brilliant success, this fact might have been winked at by the Confederacy. As it was a failure in its object and a

disaster to Morgan and the brave men who followed him, it discomfited the South and they have never quite forgiven Morgan's disobedience.

Morgan's confidence in the success of his enterprise was based upon the open disaffection for the Union cause in Indiana. The discontent was roused by the Peace Democrats. Letters to awaken discontent and cause desertion were sent into the Federal army, and the newspapers were full of treasonable articles. Public meetings were held to denounce the government and our soldiers for suppressing the rebellion. General Burnside felt great anxiety at the state of affairs in the Northwest, occasioned, he said, by selfish politicians. The work of the army was delayed because of fears of domestic traitors. It became necessary to call General Willcox from his plans in Kentucky and Tennessee into Indiana to the difficult task of settling trouble arising from disloyal citizens. Secret societies known as the "Sons of Liberty," "Knights of the Golden Circle" and numerous others were organized by sympathizers for the Southern cause. While they probably could have done no real harm, and while they were at all times under the thumb of Governor Morton, they did tend to foster a feeling of distrust among neighbors and of discontent and restlessness among soldiers throughout Indiana. Such sentiments, if allowed to grow, would have resulted disastrously to the State. The South had formed an exaggerated idea of the strength and influence of these Southern sympathizers, and it was under this false impression that Morgan entered Indiana, expecting aid, comfort and sympathy on his way. It is very probable that without this hope of sympathy, Morgan never would have attempted the raid.

Morgan was well prepared for carrying out this pet project. His men were in fine trim, and the effective strength of his command May 26, 1863, was 2,800. The whole force was at this time provided with excellent new clothing and Morgan's favorite guns; their horses were in fairly good condition and they could gather others on the raid. The Second Kentucky Morgan called his "Regulars." They had been with him on all his expeditions and were proficient, dashing and reliable. It is difficult to ascer-

tain the number of men Morgan had with him on the Indiana-Ohio raid. About three thousand is usually given as his force. Basil W. Duke says Morgan never had more than four thousand men, and in one of Morgan's letters he says he is certain that he can accomplish everything with two thousand men. Fear and false rumors led to estimates of Morgan's force as high as eight and ten thousand. It was not by numbers that Morgan expected to succeed, but rather by dash and boldness, for which he was well equipped.

In striking contrast to this able body of cavalry was the unorganized preparation for defense in Indiana, when the startling intelligence came that Morgan, the terrible, was headed this way. Governor Morton had generously responded to a call for help from General Boyle at Louisville when Kentucky was invaded, and had sent the Seventy-first Indiana, two companies of the Third Indiana and the Twenty-third Battery. Indianapolis was left with little defense. Two companies of the Sixty-third Indiana were stationed at the Soldiers' Home, and on the southern border of the State was the Indiana Legion, a loose aggregation of citizens with little military training or discipline and practically unarmed. Their most serious need was for cavalry, there being no more than two hundred regular cavalry with a small number of mounted citizens. General Willcox was in charge of the Indiana military forces in Indiana, and he and Governor Morton cooperated quickly and ably in collecting forces. Troops were ordered from Michigan, ammunition from Washington, and all railway cars and locomotives in the State were kept in readiness for the transportation of troops. On July 9, Governor Morton issued his General Order announcing the presence of the enemy and calling for all the white male citizens south of the National Road to form themselves into companies of at least sixty, to drill, arm themselves, choose officers and await further orders. The men were to be mounted if possible. The Legion officers and leading citizens were requested to assist in carrying out the order and to report to the Governor. Gunboats were ordered to patrol the Ohio river and passenger steamers were pressed into this service.

Excitement was at fever heat throughout the State. Exaggerated rumors were afloat, homes near the southern border were abandoned, and many had forethought enough to hurry their horses northward. Everywhere citizens were answering the call for troops. Grain was left to rot in the fields, tools were dropped, stores closed, books and desks abandoned and the loyal citizens swarmed to the defense. The roads leading into Indianapolis were clouded with the dust raised by hurrying thousands; railway trains rushed into the city bearing great numbers of volunteers, and Indianapolis resembled a huge barracks, every open lot and square, vacant building or hall serving as quarters for troops. In two days there were 20,000 troops in Indianapolis and 45,000 more were organized over the State ready to move at a moment's notice. This means 65,000 soldiers all collected and equipped in forty-eight hours—a record of which Indiana can be justly proud. General Willcox immediately placed these troops where they were most needed. The troops were raw, but they could scour the country felling trees in Morgan's road and destroying bridges. The Legion and Minutemen, about 2,000 strong, were placed under Major-General James Hughes. The forces were divided into the Eastern and Western divisions, the Western division being at Mitchell, and the Eastern division at Madison on the Ohio, with orders to destroy all boats that might aid Morgan in crossing. At Jeffersonville \$4,000,000 worth of supplies also had to be guarded. General Hobson with a strong cavalry force was in constant pursuit.

Not anticipating such vigorous defense in Indiana, Morgan with his entire force came boldly on toward the Ohio. By Tuesday, July 7, they reached Brandenburg, Kentucky, about forty miles below Louisville on the Ohio. While the forces were halted on the river bank, the steamer "John T. McCoombs," bound up the river, stopped, as was its custom, at Brandenburg, and was immediately boarded and captured by Morgan's men. Signals of distress were sent up by this vessel and when the "Alice Dean" answered the call for aid, she too fell into the hands of the raiders. With these two boats, crossing was facilitated and was at once begun. A part of the forces had succeeded

in crossing when, July 8, a gunboat suddenly made its appearance, causing consternation among the Confederate forces. No shots seemed to harm the gunboat, and had it held its position, Morgan's forces would have been hopelessly divided and the raid nipped in the bud, but, as suddenly as it had come, it turned and left the scene. Morgan's men with shouts of joy resumed the task of crossing. By night, July 8, the forces were safely across into Indiana, and, having taken everything of use from both the captured steamers, Morgan's men abandoned the "McCoombs" and burned the "Alice Dean." It seems curious that Morgan was not intercepted at Brandenburg. He was on the banks of the Ohio for thirty-six hours, yet he was not molested except by one gunboat which accomplished nothing. A small unorganized Federal force had gathered on the bank on the Indiana side, but they were soon worsted and driven back toward Corydon, two pickets being captured. That night Morgan's men encamped just four miles out of Corydon. Skirmishing was kept up during the night, and plundering began early. The mill owned by Mr. Peter Lapp, which was situated on Buck creek three miles from the river, was burned to the ground. The inhabitants had fled to the woods upon hearing of the approach of the enemy, and pillaging was easy, the marauders finding "larders unlocked, fires on the hearths, bread half made up and the chickens parading about the doors with a confidence that was touching but misplaced."

Early Thursday morning, July 9, Morgan advanced on Corydon. At Corydon was stationed Colonel Jordan, of the Sixth Indiana Legion, with about 400 men. On July 8, he sent to General Boyle for reenforcements but these failed to arrive in time to save the town. As Morgan approached Corydon, Jordan fell back one mile from the town and formed into battle line. At 10 o'clock in the morning the attack began and was vigorously repelled. However, Jordan's men were outnumbered eight to one, besides the disparity in arms and training, and could not hope to hold out long. Jordan saw the folly of fighting against such odds and surrendered with 345 men, whom Morgan soon paroled. The loss to Morgan's forces was eight killed and

thirty-three wounded, while Jordan lost three killed and two wounded. Morgan entered the town and took possession. Much damage was done to the stores, Douglas & Denbo Company, clothiers, sustaining a loss of \$3,500, while mill owners were forced to pay \$1,000 to save their mills from being burned. The women, sulky and frightened, prepared meals at the point of guns. Morgan was surprised to find the country in so thrifty a condition in time of war, more than 500 horses being captured in the vicinity of Corydon. Two prominent citizens were captured and placed at the front of Morgan's columns as they marched through the streets, and the danger to these esteemed townsmen deterred the people from firing upon the invaders.

Leaving his wounded, Morgan hastened on northward, dividing his forces so as to cover a wider sweep of country and to threaten the important railway centers of Mitchell, New Albany, Jeffersonville and Vienna. There was no guessing in what direction he would swerve and the people were frantic with uncertainty. Passing north by way of Greenville and Palmyra, the raiders laid waste to Harrison, Crawford, Orange, Floyd and Washington counties, capturing horses and plundering houses. At Palmyra the forces halted for two hours' rest, but many preferred plundering to resting. A force of some 350 Federals at Palmyra hastily retreated to Salem. By nine in the morning, July 10, all of Morgan's men were reunited at Salem and after a slight skirmish they easily dispersed the Minutemen and took prisoners a company of the Legion from Washington county under Captain John Davis. At Salem Morgan's men went wild. Plundering was at its worst here. The depot of the Louisville & Chicago railroad and the railroad bridge were burned, and the smaller bridges destroyed; the tracks were torn up for a long distance; \$1,000 was levied upon each mill and if payment was not made the mill was burned; stores and buildings of all sorts were robbed. Morgan's men seemed frenzied by the delight of pillage, for they would take things for which they had no possible use and which were only a trouble to carry. A dry goods store was entered and each man grabbed a bolt of calico, unwound it, and threw it away only to get a fresh one; one man carried a chafing

dish on his saddle for days, and another a bird cage; though it was hot July weather, one man rode with a pair of skates which he had stolen slung across his shoulder. Such conduct continued until two o'clock in the afternoon when Morgan received warning that General Hobson was in close pursuit; so part of the town was left in flames as the marauders hastily departed.

It was thought that Morgan might try to cross the river at Louisville or Madison, and gunboats were ordered to ply between these two points and prevent his escape. By this time Morgan had so badly demolished the telegraph system in Indiana that couriers were the only communication between Federal forces, so messages became confusing and inaccurate. Two hundred of Morgan's men did reach the Ohio at Bardstown, July 10, but General Boyle reports them cut off by Hobson, some of them being drowned and some captured.

Hobson was only twenty-five miles from Salem when Morgan fled. Morgan passed through Canton, thirty-four miles from New Albany, and through New Philadelphia, gathering all the horses he could find. He reached Vienna at six in the evening, July 10, his troops being so weary that plundering was largely given up. Here the depot and bridge were burned and the telegraph operator captured. Pressing on from Vienna they found the roads blocked, so they encamped at Lexington.

Early the next morning the raid continued on north toward Vernon. Vernon was important because it was a railroad center and there were two important bridges there of the Madison and the Ohio & Mississippi railroads. The citizens, four hundred strong, rose to defend the town, and General Love with twelve hundred troops came in time to hold the town before Morgan could enter it.

Morgan tried one of his favorite ruses here. He immediately demanded the surrender of the town without any fighting. Colonel Williams, commander of a company of the Legion, refused to surrender. At 5:40 in the evening Morgan sent another demand for surrender, which was again refused. General Love had arrived in the meantime and he now demanded Morgan's surrender. Finally at nine o'clock that night he sent a message

to General Love that he would grant a truce of thirty minutes in which the women and children could be removed to safety, and that at the end of this truce he would fire upon the town. General Lew Wallace had been ordered to Vernon with 1,300 infantry, but the railroads were in a very bad condition and he was delayed at Columbus until too late to be of use at Vernon, as it was impossible to secure horses in the confused country through which Morgan had passed. Wallace did not reach Vernon until six in the morning, July 12, but Morgan had slipped away during the previous night, having failed to put into effect his threat of besieging the town. It was evident that Morgan wished to avoid a fight. His men were worn by the strain of constant riding without rest or sleep, and with an enemy in close pursuit. The raid became from this point on, if, indeed, it had not been from the very start, a mad attempt to escape. The capture of Vernon had been dear to Morgan's heart and it had failed utterly.

General Love receiving information that Morgan was at Dupont at one in the morning of July 12, sent Captain Boyd in pursuit, and twenty or thirty stragglers were caught. At Dupont, west of Vernon, Morgan tore up part of the tracks, cut the telegraph wires, burned two bridges, a watertank and a warehouse. A porkhouse was robbed of \$1,700 worth of meat—a new kind of plunder, as Morgan's men were well supplied and had no need of the meat for food. Barns also were robbed and wheat was destroyed. Without resting the band proceeded, Sunday, July 12, toward Versailles, again changing their course. About Versailles there was a force of adequate number to have crushed Morgan, had the troops been well placed, but the Union forces were doing their best under the circumstances. They had only infantry which had to travel on railroads, while Morgan with his cavalry was constantly changing his course, only striking the railroads now and then. The Union troops were mostly raw and slow about obeying orders. The people were bewildered at the wild reports that were afloat, and in constant terror, for Morgan changed about so rapidly there was no telling where he would strike next. General Hobson was pursuing Morgan, but

his horses were jaded and there were no fresh ones to be had, so at Versailles Morgan had things pretty much his own way. He took three hundred prisoners, Minutemen under Colonel James Cravens; captured \$5,000 of public funds and foraged freely on all sides. At four o'clock that sultry Sunday afternoon he left Versailles and moved toward Osgood.

Morgan's command divided into several forces on leaving Versailles, the main body being under Basil W. Duke. This division marching on into the night, halted at Sunman, but as there was a Federal force of some 2,500 men under General Wallace, the body of cavalry turned aside and encamped for the night at a safe distance. At five o'clock on Monday morning they resumed their march, crossed the Indianapolis & Cincinnati railroad between Sunman's Station and Van Weddons, tore up the track near Sunman's, and reached Harrison, Ohio, on the State line, a little after noon on July 13. Another division encamped at Aurora Sunday night and arrived at Harrison at 3:30 Monday afternoon. About an hour before dark, Morgan's forces, now all assembled at the State line, crossed the Whitewater river and moved on into Ohio. The men were glad to be out of a State where, Morgan says, "every man, woman and child was his enemy, every hill a telegraph, and every bush an ambush." His men were utterly exhausted with hard riding and loss of sleep. At one time they were in the saddle for thirty-five hours, and some days covered ninety miles. Morgan left Indiana with the pursuers only an hour's ride behind him, and it could hardly be said that he was leaving "master of the situation" as he had proudly predicted he would be.

With dash and endurance equal to Morgan's own, General Hobson had followed in pursuit of the raiders. When Morgan started on his raid, General Hartsuff ordered Hobson and all other ready troops to start the pursuit at once. Brigadier-General Shackelford joined Hobson, July 2, and Wolford and Judah joined them soon after, the infantry keeping creditably with the cavalry. Under General Hobson there were 2,500 troops. As Morgan moved toward Brandenburg, Hobson kept in close pursuit, though forced to stop at Bardstown for supplies. At seven

o'clock in the evening he received word of Morgan's crossing the Ohio, and that night the greater part of his forces encamped twelve miles from Brandenburg. A part of them under General Shackelford pushed on toward the river, and within two miles of Brandenburg saw the smoke rising from the ill-fated "Alice Dean" and heard the triumphant shouts of Morgan's men. Hobson entered Brandenburg on the morning of July 9. The "McCoombs" which the Confederates had abandoned was sent to Louisville for transports. The transports arrived that evening, and crossing continued all night. By two o'clock in the morning of July 10 the forces were all on the Indiana side, and that day they marched fifty miles, reaching Salem Saturday morning, July 11. Then Morgan moved toward Madison through Lexington, and Hobson arrived at Lexington at eight that evening. The march had been continuous, and the men, worn and hungry, spent the night near Lexington. Morgan made one of his queer moves here and turned north on Vernon and Versailles as we have seen. Hobson's forces also reached Versailles July 12, made a short halt and arrived at Harrison only an hour behind Morgan.

Throughout the entire march through Indiana the Federal forces were treated with the utmost courtesy and kindness by the inhabitants. General Shackelford said: "The kindness, hospitality and patriotism of that noble State, as exhibited on the passage of the Federal forces, was sufficient to convince the most consummate traitor of the impossibility of severing this great Union." But of the aid most sorely needed—fresh horses—the inhabitants had none to offer. Morgan's system of horse stealing was perfect. He would send a small detachment from the front of his command, five miles into the country to collect horses, swing round and fall to the rear, thus making a ten-mile sweep. His great advantage was not only in having the lead, but also the best means of maintaining it. The Federals often found the horses left behind as broken down by Morgan, fresher than their own and pressed these poor beasts to further service, and where these failed they pressed pluckily forward on foot.

Still in the lead, Morgan hastened on through southern Ohio.

Very little resistance was offered until he reached the Ohio river near Buffington Island, July 19. Here the Federal forces were in wait for him. The river had risen unexpectedly and it was possible for Captain Le Roy Fitch to place his gunboats in advantageous positions to guard the crossing. Generals Hobson and Judah were there with their forces which, though jaded and weary, were still in good spirits and anxious to fight. Morgan was trapped, and in the fight which ensued General Shackelford captured seven hundred prisoners, their horses and arms, and two hundred more were either shot or drowned. The following morning Shackelford sent a flag of truce to the enemy, demanding their surrender. Forty minutes for consultation were granted, at the end of which time they surrendered between 1,200 and 1,300 prisoners, with all their arms and supplies. Morgan with about five hundred of his men slipped away before the surrender, turned back from the river, and headed toward Pennsylvania in the hope of joining Lee.

The Federals were not very well prepared for further pursuit. At Cincinnati Hobson's force almost went to pieces, there being only five hundred horses left in the whole command. Mounting five hundred of Hobson's men, General Shackelford, followed by Major Rue, of the Ninth Kentucky Cavalry, and Major Way, of the Ninth Michigan, undertook the capture of Morgan. They succeeded in hemming Morgan in on all sides near Salineville on the New Lisbon road, July 26, and when General Shackelford came up Morgan surrendered himself with 350 men. A small remnant escaped. The officers were consigned to the penitentiaries of Columbus and Pittsburg and the other prisoners to Camps Chase and Morton.

Morgan's life was romantic to the close. After his capture, July 26, 1863, he was placed in the Ohio State penitentiary at Columbus. Here in a little cell, with shaved head, he stayed until November 26, 1863. But he was not idle, for he with seven of his companions dug their way out of prison, made their way into the Confederacy and were greeted with open arms. Morgan reorganized his cavalry and served in Southwest Virginia and East Tennessee with some success. While asleep in a house

at Greenville, Tennessee, September 4, 1864, he was betrayed by a jealous woman, it is said, and was murdered before he could escape.

Seldom has any movement aroused such intense excitement, such exaggerated impressions and such bitter feelings as did Morgan's raid. To the North they were "Morgan, Morgan the raider, and Morgan's terrible men!" But Morgan was not the bloodthirsty ruffian that many still believe him to have been. He was a Kentucky gentleman, with a wonderful mind, unsurpassed bravery and a magnetic personality. He was fearless, tireless, reckless, kind, shrewd and original. To such a leader it is natural that hot-headed youths—lovers of the romantic—should be drawn, and men from all over the South came to follow him. The Indiana raid was his undoing. It had failed to keep the Union forces busy for more than a very few days. It had ended in disaster to Morgan. Never again did he rise to the height of success and popularity which were his before attempting the raid. It was too big an undertaking. He had been too confident, too sure of sympathy from Indiana. He had disobeyed his orders and paid dearly for his disobedience. Still in the Southern breast there lives a love and reverence for Morgan and his men. They regard him as the highest type of the Confederacy.

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EDITORIAL ADDENDUM.

To Miss Boyer's account of Morgan's raid we would add certain reminiscences that we have gathered from time to time from participants in that brief but notable campaign.

The first is from the late George W. Julian. Mr. Julian then lived at the little town of Centerville, Wayne county. Late on

the night of July 9, 1863, Centerville was aroused by a violent clanging of bells, and people hastened from their beds to learn of the Governor's urgent demand upon "all able-bodied white male citizens." The following day was spent in drumming up recruits, and twenty-four hours after the first alarm these recruits were en route, by freight, to Indianapolis, where they arrived in the gray of dawn and were marched down Washington street to Military Park, Mr. Julian, who was the tallest man in the company, his height accentuated by the wearing of a long linen duster, marching beside the shortest man to be found, the grotesque pair running the gauntlet of irreverent remarks from amused bystanders.

Indianapolis was a-creep with would-be soldiers, and trains from all directions were continually bringing in new crowds. Some time, of course, had to elapse before this mob could be converted into a military force, and in the meantime the boys were not neglectful of the amenities of life. Seven preachers in one company were the butts of continual jokes, the most popular of which was to "doctor" their canteens with rank beverages. One of these clerical gentlemen, being hastily summoned from a nap to fall in line and march down street, unconsciously bore on his back in conspicuous letters the words "OLD BOURBON WHISKY."

Mr. Sylvester Johnson, still living at Irvington at an advanced age, and Mr. Cyrus M. Smith, of the same place, were also in that mustering, and in their accounts they agree with Mr. Julian that, however earnest the Hoosier legions may have been in their patriotism, the whole affair went off like a grand lark. Mr. Johnson, who is of peaceful Quaker stock, frankly admits that he never before or since experienced such a pleasant sense of relief as when they failed to connect with the fleeing Morgan. After that failure the home-defenders went to Cincinnati, in order to return home by the I., C. & L. road, and there, it seems, they proceeded to celebrate their narrow escape from war and bloodshed. Orders were issued for a dress parade for the entertainment of the Cincinnati public, but when the time came for mustering just eight men were available. Of the others some were

scattered about town "seeing the elephant," and others were down by the river testing their guns and trying to hit the State of Kentucky.

They came back to Indianapolis by freight train, and were twenty-three hours on the way. Many hilarious pranks are told of. Among other things, the pipe of a watering tank at the town of Sunman was pulled down by some one on the top of a car just as the one passenger coach of the train came slowly up. Mr. Julian was in this coach, and a sudden flood of water spouting in at his window drenched him completely. As a change of clothing was not to be had, his only recourse was to dry himself as best he could, and the last that the citizens of Sunman saw of the Congressman from the "Burnt District" was his tall figure standing on the top of a freight car with outspread limbs, trying to get as much of the sun and breeze as possible.

The campaign was spoken of as "the eight days of war," and one wag, in describing it, said that the participants went battle-scared and came back bottle-scarred.

The above, published some years ago in a local paper, called forth the following communication from Mr. O. H. Smith, of Maryville, Missouri:

"The writer of these lines at that time," said Mr. Smith, "was living at Thorntown, Indiana, and was principal of the old academy at that place. On Thursday night, July 9, 1863, at about eight o'clock, the first news of the raid reached us by wire. An hour later came the call from Governor Morton for troops. * * * When the eight o'clock morning train from Lafayette to Indianapolis arrived, a full company of brave militiamen, eager for the fray, boarded the train for the capital. At Lebanon and other towns in the county they were joined by other companies, and went into camp at Military Park, Indianapolis. During the afternoon of Friday, the 10th, a Boone county regiment of eight companies was organized. This was the first regiment ready. By Saturday morning a brigade under General Lew Wallace, who at that time was home from the front, left for the seat of war over the old Madison railroad. At Franklin we

waited several hours for our artillery complement, which had been ordered to join us there. In the afternoon we got off again, and arrived at Columbus about dark. Then it was learned that General Morgan was at Vernon, and had just demanded the surrender of the town. This created the greatest excitement in the brigade of Home Guards. To think that we were within a few miles of a rebel army which had invaded our native soil made the blood of patriotism boil. We were ordered to fill our cartridge boxes, carry loaded arms, and cut port holes in the freight cars to shoot out of. A squad of cavalry was improvised and sent ahead of the train to scour the country for the enemy. Many rumors came to us about Morgan and his men, and many a tenderfoot trembled when he 'thought of the morrow,' and felt that the grim realities of war were soon to be upon him.

"We proceeded slowly southward, stopping frequently to wait for news from our cavalry scouts. Sometimes as these galloped by on the dirt roads near our train we were certain they were some of the rebel raiders about to surround us. Thus wore on the tedious hours of the night. Just as day dawned we arrived at North Vernon and learned that the enemy, hearing that a brave army from the north was after him, concluded that 'discretion was the better part of valor,' and, after making some demands on the citizens for needed supplies, left old Vernon, two miles south, a few hours before we arrived at North Vernon. We spent most of Sunday at Vernon, but late in the afternoon were ordered aboard the train and went to Dupont. Here we pitched our tents and began preparations for supper. But just before grub was ready we were again ordered to board the train and go back to Vernon. We never knew the reason for this, to us, singular movement, but supposed it was to try our metal and get us ready for the rough usage of war. On Monday we went east on the Ohio & Mississippi railway as far as Osgood, where a bridge, burnt the day before by Morgan, stopped our progress by rail. Here we began a twenty-mile march in the wake of the raiders, who had preceded us only about twenty-four hours. We saw many evidences of their march—broken-down horses left by the wayside, fields devastated and camp fires still burning. We

were joyfully fed by the families of farmers, who the day before had been compelled to feed the enemy. Sunman was the end of our journey. There we learned that Morgan had passed into Ohio at Harrison, hotly pursued by patriotic Hoosiers and warmly received by fighting Buckeyes."

DEATH OF GENERAL CARRINGTON.

The papers for October 29 announced the death of Brigadier-General H. B. Carrington, at Boston, at the age of eighty-eight years. At the time of the Morgan excitement General Carrington was stationed in Indianapolis, where, according to the report of Adjutant-General Terrell, he "gave his best efforts to the organization and mustering of the forces, a work in which his experience and energy made him unrivaled." One of his duties after the raid was to traverse the route taken by Morgan with a view to relieving the farmers who in the midst of their harvest season had been damaged by the hostile visitation, particularly in the loss of their horses. The same year he was active in discovering and exposing the Sons of Liberty. His reports, "Military Operations in Indiana—1862 to 1865," and "Exposure of the Sons of Liberty," comprise Documents No. 77 and No. 79 in Volume I of the Adjutant-General's Report.